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Forecasting forecasts: The trend effect
Sigrid Møyner Hohle∗ Karl Halvor Teigen†
Abstract
People often make predictions about the future based on trends they have observed in the past. Revised probabilistic fore-
casts can be perceived by the public as indicative of such a trend. In five studies, we describe experts who make probabilistic
forecasts of various natural events (effects of climate changes, landslide and earthquake risks) at two points in time. Prognoses
that have been upgraded or downgraded from T1 to T2 were in all studies expected to be updated further, in the same direction,
later on (at T3). Thus, two prognoses were in these studies enough to define a trend, forming the basis for future projections.
This “trend effect” implies that non-experts interpret recent forecast in light of what the expert said in the past, and think, for
instance, that a “moderate” landslide risk will cause more worry if it has previously been low than if it has been high. By
transcending the experts’ most recent forecasts the receivers are far from conservative, and appear to know more about the
experts’ next prognoses than the experts themselves.
Keywords: climate forecasts, predictions, risk communication, trends, evaluability.
1 Introduction
Predictions of future events, like climate changes, are rarely
made with certainty and can, at best, be described in proba-
bilistic terms. New observations and improved models will
lead to updated predictions, where the original estimates are
revised, upwards or downwards, as the case may be. For in-
stance, each month the International Research Institute for
Climate and Society issues a seasonal climate forecast for
the entire globe, including the likelihood of the weather phe-
nomenon El Niño. The February 2015 forecast stated that
“Based on the latest models, the chance of an El Niño devel-
oping during the current (February-April) season is around
48%, down from 63% last month” (Gawthrop, 2015, Febru-
ary 20). How do people perceive such revised forecasts? If
the chance of an El Niño has decreased from 63% in January
to 48% in February, what will happen in March?
Revised forecasts such as these could give rise to differ-
ent expectations for future developments. For the present
purpose, we will distinguish between three strategies. One
would be simply to discard the first estimate and stick to the
last, updated estimate as the best forecast available. Alter-
natively, the existence of two different estimates might be
taken to mean that “the truth” lies somewhere in between.
This strategy would lead to future estimates that are more
regressive (more “conservative”) than the most recent ones.
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Thirdly, the change from the first to the second estimate
could be viewed as a trend towards increased or decreased
certainty that might be extrapolated into an even more ex-
treme future: In March, the chance of an El Niño will be
even lower than 48%. In the following, we will refer to
these three strategies as predicting “no change” (i.e., from
the most recent forecast), a “reversed trend”1, and a “con-
tinued trend”, respectively.
Studies of trend perceptions in other areas have amply
demonstrated that people use autocorrelations within a time
series to extrapolate trends, thinking that an increasing trend
will continue to increase, and a decreasing trend will con-
tinue to decrease, although somewhat less steeply (trend
damping) (Harvey & Reimers, 2013; Lewandowsky, 2011;
Svenson, 1991). These studies have typically involved a se-
ries, rather than just two, observations prior to predictions.
Moreover, they have focused on judgment-independent ob-
servations and measurements, rather than expert predictions.
The task of predicting a forecaster’s future predictions,
which is the theme of the present studies, could be a chal-
lenge. On one hand, probabilistic predictions that have al-
ready been revised once suggest that the forecaster may
change her mind again in the future. On the other hand,
we do not know in which direction. If the expert herself had
suspected that her future probability estimates, at T3, would
be higher rather than lower, this should have been incorpo-
rated in her probability estimate already, at T2. The receiver
of a revised forecast may suspect that the present forecast
will not be the final one, but without further privileged in-
formation, the most reasonable option is arguably to keep
the most recent forecast as the best guess. Whether and how
1This category would include all estimates that are below an ”upgraded”
or above a ”downgraded” estimate.
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the forecast has changed relative to a past estimate should
not affect the prediction of the subsequent forecast.
Observations from football betting (Tassoni, 1996) and
the stock market (Shefrin, 2001), suggest that bettors and
investors “overreact” to recent positive performances, ap-
parently looking for positive trends that they believe will
continue into the future (Offerman & Sonnemans, 2004).
Such trend perceptions are formed quickly. Carlson and Shu
(2007) found evidence for a “rule of three”, which indicates
that three observations in a row are all it takes to form a
perceived “streak”, suggesting that more of the same will
follow. In Carlson and Shu’s experiments the observations
were either identical to each other (e.g., three successful out-
comes in a row), or forming a linear increase (e.g., an invest-
ment object going up 1% on three consecutive days). These
streaks were observed in domains where outcomes are sur-
rounded by considerable uncertainty (gambles, stock prices,
basketball shots), and could partly or wholly be attributed to
chance factors. In the present research, we suggest an even
simpler “rule of two” for deliberate, non-chance changes
in estimates. When the International Research Institute up-
dates their probability of El Niño they do not produce their
estimates by rolling dice, but by entering new observations
into complex and well-tried models. The deliberateness and
apparent reliability of this process lend the estimates an air
of objectivity; so two estimates may be enough to demon-
strate the existence of a “true” decrease or increase. The
trend from T1 to T2 is in this case obvious, the question
being simply whether it is predicted to continue. Such pro-
jections will in the present paper be called a trend effect.
Results compatible with a trend effect were obtained in
a study by Juanchich, Teigen and Villejoubert (2010, Table
2). In one of their experiments, participants were told about
a suspect whose probability of guilt was estimated by a pro-
filer at two separate occasions, T1 and T2. In two conditions,
the profiler revised his probabilities upward from .40 to .60,
or from .20 to .40, after taking new evidence into account. In
two other conditions, the probability was revised downward
from .80 to .60, or from .60 to .40. The study was primar-
ily about verbal communication of probabilities, but partici-
pants were also asked how strongly they were convinced that
the suspect was guilty. This was expected to be a function
of the most recent probability estimate, at T2 (.40 vs. .60),
but might also be related to the direction of revision (trend).
Both effects were confirmed by a 2 x 2 analysis of variance
(not reported in the original publication), which yielded a
significant main effect of probability magnitude, F(1,121) =
9.71, p < .002, η2p = .07, and also a significant main effect
of trend, F(1,121) = 14.37, p = .001, η2p = .11 (no signifi-
cant interaction). This is interesting, as it indicates that the
same probability at T2 will differentially affect participants’
beliefs, dependent upon its value in the past. In this case, re-
duced probabilities were regarded as clearly less convincing
than identical probabilities that were the result of an increas-
ing trend. It is as if the participants were predicting that next
week, evidence might be found that will further weaken the
likelihood of guilt in the first case, and strengthen the sus-
picion in the second. In other words, they may think of the
revised probabilities as indications for some sort of mono-
tonic trend that will continue into the future.
1.1 The present research
In this article we propose and test the idea that one revi-
sion of a probabilistic forecast is perceived as indicative of a
trend that is expected to continue in subsequent revised fore-
casts. Consequently, when faced with an upgraded forecast,
people will predict further upgrades to take place later on,
while a downgraded forecast will cause predictions of lower
forecasts in the future.
In five studies, and across a variety of climate-related do-
mains, we examined the effects of a change between two
forecasts at T1 and T2 on receivers’ predictions of a future
forecast at T3. The main focus was on revised probabilities,
but people’s forecasts about other projected quantities, such
as the most likely future sea level rise, were also examined.
Studies 1–3 explored people’s predictions of future forecasts
concerning sea level rise, temperature change and agricul-
tural productivity by the year 2100, after receiving current
forecasts that had been updated from an initial, higher or
lower value. The forecasts were produced either by a hu-
man judge (a climate scientist) or by a computer. Study 4
examined the perception of revised landslide risks that were
expressed categorically, according to a simple color scheme.
Participants were in this study asked who would be most
worried by a “moderate” (yellow) risk: people who learned
that it used to be “serious” (red), or those who knew it used
to be minor (green). In Study 5 we compared the perception
of revised earthquake risks for areas that were presented to-
gether (joint mode) or singly (separate mode). In this study
the reduced risk was consistently higher than the stable and
the increased risk, pitting trend information against infor-
mation about risk levels.
2 Study 1: Predicting the next cli-
mate forecast
2.1 Method
A questionnaire was given to 62 students taking part in an
introductory course in educational science at the University
of Oslo (79% female, age: M = 21.5, SD = 3.4).
All respondents were informed about the conclusions of
two reports written by a fictional climate scientist, Heidi
Knutsen, concerning sea level rise and temperature change
by year 2100. The predictions were allegedly made at two
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Table 1: Predicted forecasts for sea level and temperature rise after increase or decrease in previous forecasts, Study 1. N =
62.
Prediction strategy, n (%)
Forecast Trend (T1 − T2)
Mean predicted
forecast T3 (SD)
Continued
trend
No change
Reversed
trend
N
Sea levela Decrease (60 cm – 40 cm) 36.9 cm (18.2) 18 (53%) 4 (12%) 12 (35%) 34 (100%)
(quantity) Increase (20 cm – 40 cm) 50.1 cm (15.8) 18 (64%) 6 (21%) 4 (14%) 28 (100%)
Temperatureb Decrease (80% – 70%) 62.2% (11.1) 21 (66%) 7 (22%) 4 (13%) 32 (100%)
(probability) Increase (60% – 70%) 75.4% (15.7) 21 (78%) 2 (7%) 4 (15%) 27 (100%)
T1: Experts’ forecast in 2000; T2: Experts’ forecast in 2013; T3: Predicted forecast in 10 years.
a Most likely sea level rise in year 2100, relative to 2000; b Probability of a temperature increase of about 3 °C by
2100, relative to 2000.
different points in time. For half of the participants, es-
timates increased from the first report to the second. For
the other half, the values decreased. Respondents were ran-
domly assigned to four conditions, in a 2 x 2 design, with
presentation order (sea level estimates first/last) and direc-
tion of trend (increasing/decreasing) as the two factors. Af-
ter a brief introduction, the two scenarios were described as
follows [decreasing estimates in brackets].
Sea level rise. In 2000, Heidi Knutsen concluded
that the global sea level in year 2100 most likely
would be 20 [60] cm higher than in 2000. In her
most recent report (2013), she concludes that the
global sea level in 2100 most likely will be 40
cm higher than in 2000. In her most recent re-
port (2013) she concludes that the global sea level
in 2100 most likely will be 40 cm higher than
in 2000. Knutsen continues to gather informa-
tion and improve her models. Imagine that she
in ten years publishes a new report on sea level
rise. What do you think she will now consider as
the most likely sea level in 2100?
In 2100 the sea level will be ___ cm higher than
in 2000.
Temperature rise. In 2000, Heidi Knutsen con-
cluded that it is 60% [80%] likely that the global
mean temperature in year 2100 will be about 3°C
higher than in 2000. In her most recent report
(2013), she concludes that this temperature in-
crease is 70% likely. Knutsen continues to gather
information and improve her models. Imagine
that she in ten years publishes a new report about
temperature changes. What do you think she will
conclude in her new report?
It is ___% likely that the temperature will increase
with about 3°C by year 2100.
2.1.1 Climate change beliefs.
After making their predictions of the expert’s future fore-
cast, all participants answered a questionnaire concerning
their own climate beliefs. This measure, originally de-
veloped by Austgulen (2012), consisted of ten statements
(example item: “Climate change is just natural variation
in the temperature of the earth”), to be rated on Likert
scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (com-
pletely agree).2 Five items indicating climate skepticism
were reverse scored, and answers in the response category
“I don’t know” were recoded as 3 (neutral), to yield an over-
all score for belief in human-caused climate change. This
measure was included to assess whether the present sample
was comparable to the Norwegian population at large, and to
investigate whether personal attitudes affected participants’
expectations of future forecasts.
2.2 Results and discussion
Mean predictions of the expert’s future prognoses are sum-
marized in Table 1. Two-factor (order x trend) ANOVAs for
each scenario reveal a highly significant main effect of trend
upon future sea level predictions, F(1, 58) = 9.34, p = .003,
η2p = .139, and a similar effect upon future probability es-
timates, F(1, 55) = 16.49, p < .001, η2p = .231. (There was
also an indication of order effects, as the estimates were gen-
erally lower, and the difference between trends more con-
spicuous in the temperature first conditions. However, none
of these main effects or interactions reached significance.)
As shown in Table 1, participants who had been told that
Knutsen’s past predictions of sea level had increased from
20 to 40 cm thought that her future prognosis would be on
the average 50.1 cm, adding 10 cm to her most recent esti-
mate. Those who were told that her prognosis had decreased
2All items are listed as variable labels in the data file.
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from 60 to 40 cm were less in agreement about their future
projections, but their estimates were on average consider-
ably lower, suggesting a mean sea level rise of 36.9 cm as
Knutsen’s future prognosis.
The probability scenario yielded similar findings. Knut-
sen’s probability of a 3 °C temperature increase was be-
lieved to become still higher (from 70% to 75.4%) in the
increase condition, and still lower (from 70% to 62.2%) in
the decrease condition. Overall, a majority of participants
projected the trend observed in Knutsen’s past predictions
into the future, indicating higher values than Knutsen’s last
estimate when the trend was increasing, and lower values
than her last estimate when it had been decreasing, as shown
in the right half of Table 1. Only a small minority (16%)
thought that her most recent estimates would serve as a “best
guess” of her future estimates. Among those who predicted
a change, continued trends were much more common than
reversed trends (p < .001 by binomial tests).
The climate belief questionnaire showed that participants
were overall more climate change believers than skeptics,
with a mean score of 3.81 (SD = 0.73). This comes close
to the results from Austgulen’s (2012) national sample with
1500 participants, with participants in the present study be-
ing slightly less skeptical than the national sample about cli-
mate change caused by human behavior.
Interestingly, probability estimates correlated positively
with climate beliefs both in the increasing (r = .48) and the
decreasing (r = .36) conditions. Also estimated sea level rise
correlated positively with climate beliefs in the increasing
condition (r = .40), but not in the decreasing condition (r
= –.19). All positive correlations are significant at the .05
level. For sea-level rise, the interaction between beliefs and
direction was significant (p = .034), although the main effect
of direction (but not beliefs) was still significant (p = .006)
when the interaction term was excluded. Thus, participants’
estimates of what the climate expert is going to say in ten
years are determined by the observed trend in the forecasts
combined with their individual beliefs about climate change.
3 Study 2: Computers versus human
forecasters
Study 1 did not make it entirely clear to participants how
the forecasts were obtained. Participants were told that
“since different climate models give different expectations
of the future climate, and because scientists get new in-
formation and develop their models, their prognoses may
change”. However, it was not explicitly stated whether prog-
noses were based on climate models alone or in combination
with human judgment. Respondents might assume that the
expert’s opinions and intuitions played a part as well. Hu-
man judges are known to modify their original judgments
rather slowly, due to some bias, such as conservatism (Ed-
wards, 1968), confirmation bias, a need to appear consistent,
or anchoring and under-adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Thus one might argue that the forecast at T2 might
have been revised too little, and that it would still take time
and another report for the expert to bring her forecasts in ac-
cordance with the available information. This might justify
an expectation of future revisions. This explanation would,
however, apply only to forecasts made by a (biased) human
forecaster, and not to forecasts made by a mechanical de-
vice. Study 2 was designed to control for this possibility,
by comparing forecasts produced by a human expert with
forecasts produced by a computer.
3.1 Method
Participants were 243 American respondents recruited
through the online subject pool Mechanical Turk (53%
male, age: M = 34.9 years, SD = 11.7, seven respondents
were removed due to failed attention check). Most respon-
dents (85.1%) reported to have at least some college edu-
cation. Respondents were presented with the same tem-
perature scenario as in Study 1, except that half of partic-
ipants were told that the forecasts were obtained by a com-
puter model. The other half was told that a climate scien-
tist produced the forecasts. Participants were randomly al-
located to four conditions, in a 2 x 2 design, with forecaster
(computer/climate scientist) and direction of trend (increas-
ing/decreasing) as the two factors. All participants were
asked to predict the future probability of a temperature rise
of about 3 °C (5.4 °F), as in Study 1. The vignettes given
to participants in the two forecaster conditions are presented
below [decreasing estimates in brackets].
Computer forecasts. A large meteorological in-
stitute has over the past 15 years used an ad-
vanced computer program to predict future cli-
mate changes. The projections are based on com-
plex climate models, integrating a large variety
of information relevant for the climate. Climate
prognoses may change over time, because of im-
proved models or changes in the factors affecting
the climate. Imagine that the institute has released
two reports on future temperatures, based on the
computer model. In 2000, output from the com-
puter model indicated that it is 60% [80%] likely
that the average global temperature by year 2100
will be about 3 °C (5.4 °F) higher than in 2000.
In the most recent report (2013), output from the
computer model indicated that it is 70% likely that
the average global temperature by 2100 will be
about 3 °C (5.4 °F) higher than in 2000. Imag-
ine that the computer model in 10 years is used to
project the future temperature change. What do
you think the output will indicate this time?
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Table 2: Predicted forecasts for temperature rise after increase or decrease in previous forecasts. Forecasts are produced by
climate scientist or computer model, Study 2. N = 243.
Prediction strategy, n (%)
Forecaster Trend (T1 − T2)
Mean predicted
forecast T3 (SD)
Continued
trend
No change
Reversed
trend
N
Human Decrease (80% – 70%) 63.8% (15.2) 40 (65%) 8 (13%) 14 (23%) 62 (100%)
Increase (60% – 70%) 76.7% (11.2) 48 (83%) 3 (5%) 7 (12%) 58 (100%)
Computer Decrease (80% – 70%) 59.5% (20.1) 45 (74%) 6 (10%) 10 (16%) 61 (100%)
Increase (60% – 70%) 69.2% (21.0) 39 (63%) 7 (11%) 16 (26%) 62 (100%)
All forecasts give the probability of a temperature increase of about 3 °C by 2100, relative to 2000.
T1: Forecast in 2000; T2: Forecast in 2013; T3: Predicted forecast in 10 years.
It is ____ % likely that the average global temper-
ature by 2100 will be about 3 °C (5.4 °F) higher
than in 2000.
Human forecasts. Dr. Mary Johnson is a climate
scientist. Over the past 15 years, Dr. Johnson has
been predicting future climate changes. Her pro-
jections integrate a large variety of information
relevant for the climate. Climate prognoses may
change over time, because of improved models or
changes in the factors affecting the climate. Imag-
ine that Dr. Johnson has released two reports on
future temperatures. In 2000, Dr. Johnson’s re-
port indicated that it is 60% [80%] likely that the
average global temperature by year 2100 will be
about 3 °C (5.4 °F) higher than in 2000. Dr. John-
son’s most recent report (2013) indicated that it is
70% likely that the average global temperature by
2100 will be about 3 °C (5.4 °F) higher than in
2000. Imagine that Dr. Johnson releases a new
report in 10 years about the future temperature
change. What do you think her report will indi-
cate this time?
It is _____ % likely that the average global tem-
perature by 2100 will be about 3 °C (5.4 °F)
higher than in 2000.
3.1.1 Climate change beliefs
After submitting their predictions participants rated their be-
liefs in human-caused climate change on an English transla-
tion of the climate questionnaire used in Study 1.
3.2 Results and discussion
A majority of participants in all conditions predicted a con-
tinued trend, as shown in Table 2, resulting in higher prob-
ability estimates at T3 for increasing than for decreasing
trends. A two-factor (forecaster x trend) ANOVA yields a
significant main effect of trend, F(1, 239) = 25.64, p < .001,
η2p = .097. There was also a significant main effect of fore-
caster, F(1, 239) = 16.49, p < .001, η2p = .231, with com-
puter forecasts around 5 percent points lower than human
forecasts (no significant interaction).
Participants who were told that a climate scientist pro-
duced the forecasts predicted similar future changes as did
the Norwegian students in Study 1, replicating the trend ef-
fect in an online study with a different (American) sample.
Replacing the human expert with a computer did not
make the trend effect disappear. Only 10% retained the
T2 forecast as their best guess. Of those who predicted a
change from T2 to T3 a large majority suggested more trend
projection at T3, as indicated by a comparison between the
columns for continued and reversed trends in the table (bi-
nomial tests give p < .001 in all four conditions).
In the mean predicted forecasts, reported in Table 2, the
trend effects appear to be somewhat attenuated by large in-
dividual differences, with some participants giving very low
future probabilities. These low estimates, which mostly oc-
curred in the computer condition, might be due to the pre-
ciseness of the prognosis. The forecast described the prob-
ability of a temperature rise of about 3 °C. As the sample
in Study 2 was American, participants were informed about
the Fahrenheit equivalent of 3 °C (5.4 °F) in parenthesis, 5.4
perhaps suggesting a value too specific to be predicted as the
most likely temperature change ten years from now, given
the uncertainty surrounding climate changes. It would be
particularly unlikely in the case of a computer-made fore-
cast, which might be expected to contain exact values (in-
cluding decimals). The low probabilities given by some par-
ticipants could accordingly reflect an expectation of a future
“most likely value” different from (above or below) 3 °C.
However, considering the large proportion of participants
who follow the trends even in the computer conditions
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(68.3% vs. 73.3% in the human conditions, χ2 (1, 243) =
0.746, p = .388), it is evident that the trend effect is not
limited to forecasts produced by a human expert. Thus the
trend effect cannot be merely a way to adjust for a biased
forecaster.
Participants’ attitudes to climate change were similar to
those of participants in Study 1, with identical mean score,
M = 3.81 (SD = 0.87). As in Study 1, there was an associa-
tion between personal belief in climate change and expected
future probabilities. Belief in climate change was positively
associated with predicted probabilities in the increasing con-
ditions (computer condition: r = .40, p = .001; human expert
condition: r = .33, p = .011), but more mixed in the decreas-
ing conditions (computer: r = .25, p = .050; human: r = .03,
p = .799), where participants’ beliefs in climate changes and
the trend effect pull in opposite directions.
4 Study 3: Predicting the next grain
production forecast
This study was designed as a conceptual replication of Study
1, avoiding potential order effects by featuring only one sce-
nario. Instead of describing the probabilities of a specific fu-
ture quantity (“the likelihood of a temperature rise of about
3 °C”) the forecasts in Study 3 describe probabilities of a fu-
ture quantity above a specific value. In this way, high prob-
abilities in both present and future forecasts became more
plausible. Moreover, we chose predictions of agricultural
productivity, where the effects of climate changes (for better
or worse) are debatable. For instance, while warmer temper-
atures could increase the growing season and thus the cereal
productivity in Norway, new diseases and increased risk of
heavy rainfall could have a damaging influence (Yara, n.d.).
Therefore, forecasts about cereal productivity that are either
increasing or decreasing might be more realistic than the
trends presented in Studies 1 and 2.
4.1 Method
Participants were 101 students attending a course in psy-
chology at the University college of Lillehammer, Norway
(75% female, age: M = 21.6 years, SD = 5.1, two partici-
pants were removed due to extreme outliers or missing re-
sponses). Respondents were randomly assigned to one of
four conditions in a 2 x 2 design, with productivity esti-
mate (amount/probability) and direction of trend (increas-
ing/decreasing) as the two factors.
All groups were given a brief introduction about cereal
production in Norway and the uncertainty surrounding the
expected grain crops in year 2100, due to climate change.
They were told that Randi Rugstad, an expert on agricul-
ture and climate change, had written several reports on the
future of grain crop in Norway, which is commonly mea-
sured in terms of areal productivity (kg per acreage of land).
They then received her predictions framed either in terms of
increasing [decreasing] amounts, or in terms of increasing
[decreasing] probabilities of a given target amount.
Amounts. In 2000, Randi Rugstad concluded a
report that in year 2100 it will be produced 400
[600] kg of grain or more per decare (1000 m2). In
her most recent report (2013), Rugstad concludes
that the areal productivity will be higher [lower].
She now estimates it to be 500 kg or more per
decare. Rugstad continues to gather information
on grain production and climate changes. Imagine
that she issues a new report in ten years. How do
you think she will conclude?
In 2100 it will be produced ____ kg of grain or
more per decare.
Probabilities. In 2000, Randi Rugstad concluded
a report that in year 2100 it will be produced 500
kg or more grain per decare (1000 m2), with a
probability of 50% [70%]. In her most recent re-
port (2013), she concludes that the probability for
this productivity is higher [lower]. She now es-
timates a probability of 60%. Rugstad continues
to gather information on grain production and cli-
mate changes. Imagine that she issues a new re-
port in ten years. How do you think she will con-
clude?
She now estimates a probability of ____% for pro-
ducing 500 kg grain or more per decare.
4.1.1 Climate change beliefs
Participants were subsequently asked to indicate their agree-
ment with the statement: “I’m sure that human-made cli-
mate changes occur”, on a scale from 1 (completely dis-
agree) to 5 (completely agree).
4.2 Results and discussion
As in the previous studies, most participants saw the
changes in the expert’s reports from T1 to T2 as indication
of trends they thought would continue into the future. When
Rugstad’s estimates of grain productivity increased from
400 to 500 kg, 52% thought that her next estimates would
be above 500 kg, whereas 77% of those who were told that
her estimates were reduced from 600 to 500 kg guessed that
her future estimates would be below 500 kg (see Table 3).
Participants in the probability conditions similarly thought
that an increased certainty from T1 to T2 would lead to even
higher certainty estimates in the future, and vice versa for re-
duced certainty estimates. There were more trend followers
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Table 3: Predicted forecasts for grain production after increase or decrease in previous forecasts, Study 3. N = 101
Prediction strategy, n (%)
Forecast Trend (T1 − T2)
Mean predicted
forecast T3 (SD)
Continued
trend
No change
Reversed
trend
N
Amounta Decrease (600 kg – 500 kg) 425.8 kg (58.5) 20 (77%) 4 (15%) 2 (8%) 26 (100%)
Increase (400 kg – 500 kg) 511.8 kg (100.1) 15 (52%) 6 (21%) 8 (28%) 29 (100%)
Probabilityb Decrease (70% – 60%) 48.3% (10.3) 21 (88%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 24 (100%)
Increase (50% – 60%) 65.3% (9.7) 16 (73%) 2 (9%) 4 (18%) 22 (100%)
T1: Experts’ forecast in 2000; T2: Experts’ forecast in 2013; T3: Predicted forecast in 10 years.
a Minimum grain production in year 2100, in kg per 1000 m2.
b Probability of producing 500 kg or more grain per 1000 m2 in 2100, in %.
than reversers in all conditions, the differences being signif-
icant by binomial tests for probability decrease (p < .001),
probability increase (p = .012) and decreasing amounts (p
< .001), but not for increasing amounts (p = .21). Overall,
only 13% kept Rugstad’s most recent estimate.
As a result, mean predicted productivity estimates were
higher in the increasing than in the decreasing condition,
Mincreasing = 512 kg vs. Mdecreasing = 426 kg; t(53) = - 3.95,
p < .001. Future probability estimates were also believed to
be higher after an increase than after a decrease,Mincreasing =
65% vs. Mdecreasing = 48%; t(44) = - 5.74, p < .001. It appears
that the participants expected somewhat smaller changes
(relative to Rugstad’s most recent report) in the increase than
in the decrease conditions, perhaps because they felt it hard
to believe that climate changes could have beneficial effects.
Most respondents agreed strongly with the statement
about anthropogenic climate change (M = 4.46, SD = .70).
In the decrease condition there was a negative correlation
between agreement with this statement and future produc-
tivity estimates (r = –.46, p = .02), implying that participants
with a strong belief in climate change were especially prone
to believe that a negative trend in prognoses would continue.
5 Study 4: Judging revised categori-
cal risks
The previous studies demonstrated that numerical prognoses
that change over time are expected to continue to change.
As a result, the most recent prognosis is not regarded as fi-
nal, and two numerically identical prognoses may be taken
to indicate an upward or a downward trend, dependent on
how they differ from previous prognoses. Such changes
appear to be more conspicuous, or in Hsee and Zhang’s
(2010) terminology, more evaluable than the individual nu-
merical estimates. In the risk management literature, risk
magnitudes are often categorized according to a simplified
scheme as “low”, “medium”, and “high”, accompanied by
color codes (green, yellow, and red), (Bostrom, Anselin &
Farris, 2008; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2006; Fast Project Plans, n. d.). This system is designed
to combine the two basic dimensions of risk: probability
and impact, such that high (red) risk indicates an adverse
event with high probability of occurring, or severe conse-
quences, or both. Similarly, a risk can be considered low
(green) if severe consequences are unlikely, or the expected
damages are small. This simple perceptual scheme serves
to enhance the evaluability of individual risk judgments,
which might reduce the need for comparisons and specu-
lations about trends. Study 4 explored whether people will
base their predictions mainly on the last, categorical (color-
coded) prognosis, or still rely on trend information derived
from such prognoses given at two different points in time.
Will a yellow risk that has been “upgraded” from green ap-
pear more, less, or equally risky as one that has been “down-
graded” from red?
5.1 Method
Participants were undergraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Tromsø (n = 46) and the University of Oslo (n = 32),
76% female, attending lectures on judgment and decision-
making. Both groups received identical questionnaires ex-
cept that the names of the mountains and their locations
were counterbalanced, to control for individual associations
to names and places. Data collections took place in the fall
of 2014, shortly after a spell of extreme weather conditions
provoking threats of landslide in several mountainous ar-
eas in Norway. Respondents were told that geologists com-
municate risks according to a color system in which green
means low (acceptable) risk, yellow means moderate risk,
while red means high (unacceptable) risk. They were then
asked to consider a situation where three target areas are
monitored for landslide risks. Risk assessments are made
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 5, September 2015 Forecasting forecasts: The trend effect 423
twice, the first time on October 15 (T1), and then again two
weeks later (T2). Three (fictional) mountains received the
following color codes:
Lomhesten: T1: Yellow. T2: Yellow
Svartoksen: T1: Green. T2: Yellow
Buttdalshornet: T1: Red. T2: Yellow
Imagine that you interview people living below these
mountains. Who do you think will be the most worried?
Participants were asked to rank the three populations from
1 (most worried) to 3 (least worried). They were then told
that a landslide actually happened, and asked to fill out the
following sentence: “I would be most surprised if the land-
slide happened in ____ , and least surprised if it happened
in ____”.
Observe that the risk at T2 is the same (yellow) for all
three mountains, whereas the risks at T1 vary. Risk assess-
ments that are based on the current risk (T2) alone would
lead to an equal degree of worry, and equally (un)surprising
landslides in all three locations. If judges take T1 into ac-
count, they can use one of two strategies: With an averaging
strategy, Buttdalshornet would be considered as most risky
(and least surprising) because the risk has previously been
red in this area. An extrapolation strategy would lead to
a reverse rank order, with Buttdalshornet as least risky be-
cause the risk has decreased, and Svartoksen as most risky
because the risk has increased.
5.2 Results and discussion
Supporting the trend (extrapolation) hypothesis, a majority
of participants (61%) thought that people living in Svar-
toksen, where the risk had increased from green to yellow,
would be the most worried. Another 28% thought that the
inhabitants of Buttdalshornet, where the risk had been red
before it was downgraded to yellow, were the most worried,
in line with an averaging strategy. The ranking procedure
did not allow participants to judge the risks as equal, yet
four participants commented that there should be no differ-
ence. Most participants (62%) ranked Lomhesten, where the
risk had been unchanged from T1 to T2, in the middle.
To test the relative strength of the trend hypothesis, the
ranks of Svartoksen and Buttdalshornet were directly com-
pared, showing that yellow after green would create more
worry than yellow after red, according to 67.6 vs. 32.4% of
the participants. The difference is highly significant by a bi-
nomial test (p = .003). Yellow after green was also believed
to create more concern than unchanged (yellow) risks (68.9
vs. 31.1%, p = .002).
When participants were asked to report their own surprise
in the case of an actual landslide, their choices were more
equal, as half of them (48.6%) declared they would be more
surprised after an increasing trend, and half (51.4%) after
a decrease. A landslide in Lomhesten, the mountain asso-
ciated with unchanging risk, would give rise to more sur-
prise than in (decreasing) Buttdalshornet (71.4% vs. 28.6%,
p < .001) and to some extent also in (increasing) Svartoksen
(60.0% vs. 40.0%, n.s.).
The ranking procedure used in the present study did not
allow participants to judge all moderate (yellow) risks as
equal, and in a way, forced them to take predictions at T1
into account. Thus it cannot be regarded as a completely
fair test of the categorical approach, where hazards that are
given the same color code should be treated as equally risky.
However, if the current degree of risk is all that counts, rank
orders should be randomly chosen. But in fact one rank or-
der (increasing, stable, decreasing) out of six possible orders
was a clear favorite, chosen by 40%. If predictions at T1 are
taken into consideration, one could as well have argued for
the reverse order. A yellow risk that has been downgraded
from red has, if anything, a more sinister “track record”
compared to a risk that was previously assessed to be minor
(green), and might accordingly suggest a stronger landslide
potential, especially if fluctuations in assessments and the
measurement of landslide indicators are taken into account.
Yet, the present participants believed that inhabitants of the
regions at risk would be more worried by increases of a risk
that used to be small, and claimed that a landslide after up-
graded and downgraded risks would be equally surprising.
6 Study 5: Judging risks in separate
versus joint mode
Participants in the previous studies received forecasts that
were identical at T2 across conditions (Studies 1–3) or
within the same condition (Study 4). Study 5 was designed
to compare prognoses that differed both at T1 and T2 in
such a way that “increasing” prognoses described lower lev-
els of risk than “decreasing” prognoses, even at T2 (with
unchanged prognoses in between). Participants could ac-
cordingly base their worries and future predictions either on
risk level or on trend information, or both. We assume, in
line with Hsee (1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Baz-
erman, 1999), that risk level will be more evaluable when
different levels can be compared in a within-Ss design (joint
mode). While the results from Studies 1–3 indicate that re-
ceivers make a prognosis evaluable by comparing it to pre-
ceding prognoses, we explore in this study how receivers
perceive a revised prognosis when information about other
revised prognoses is available: Will they still rely on past
prognoses (in line with the trend effect), or will they switch
to a comparison with other, concurrent prognoses? Partic-
ipants in Study 5 were accordingly asked to judge risks of
different levels, associated with different trends, which were
presented either jointly or separately.
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Table 4: Worry and predicted risk estimates in cities with increasing, stable, and decreasing seismic risk, Study 5. N = 210.
Joint mode Separate mode
Location Trend (T1 − T2)
Predicted risk
T3
Continued
trend
Worrya
Predicted risk
T3
Continued
trend
Worrya
Westerlea Increase (20% – 35%) 40.2% (12.9) 67% 4.00 (1.58) 40.2% (13.4) 70% 4.43 (1.41)
Pryedge Unchanging (40% – 40%) 40.0% (3.0) 81% 4.48 (1.39) 36.6% (10.4) 59% 4.25 (1.29)
Brookland Decrease (60% – 45%) 38.3% (10.2) 67% 4.69 (1.41) 36.1% (11.8) 75% 4.35 (1.51)
T1: Seismic risk 2 weeks ago; T2: Seismic risk today; T3: Predicted seismic risk in 2 weeks.
a Expected worry level of inhabitants, on 1-7 scales.
6.1 Method
Participants were 210 American respondents recruited
through the online subject pool Mechanical Turk (55%
male, age: M = 34.3 years, SD = 12.3, three respondents
were removed due to failed attention check or extreme out-
liers). They were randomly allocated to four different con-
ditions, one joint mode condition (A), describing earthquake
risks in three different cities, and three separate mode con-
ditions (B, C, and D), describing the earthquake risk in each
of these cities.
All respondents were told that an earthquake institute op-
erates with a seismic risk scale that goes from 0–100%,
where 0 means no risk of earthquake and 100% extremely
high risk. Respondents in the joint mode condition (Con-
dition A) received information about the risk of a moderate
earthquake in the city of Westerlea, which two weeks ago
was estimated to 20% on the seismic risk scale. Today, two
weeks later, the risk is 35%. In another city, Pryedge, the
risk was 40% both two weeks ago and today. In a third
city, Brookland, the risk was 60% two weeks ago, and is
45% today. In the three separate mode conditions, respon-
dents received information only about Westerlea (Condition
B), Pryedge (Condition C), or Brookland (Condition D) (all
these city names were fictional). Observe that these risk es-
timates do not only differ in direction (increasing, stable,
decreasing), but also in level at T2. Thus the risk level of the
increasing risk was consistently lower than the other risks,
whereas the decreasing risk remained higher than the others.
Respondents were asked to imagine that they lived in one
of these areas, and rated to which extent they would be
concerned about earthquakes as an inhabitant of Westerlea
[Pryedge] [Brookland], on a seven-point scale from 1 (not at
all concerned) to 7 (extremely concerned). They were also
asked to guess the next risk estimate issued by the earth-
quake institute (in two weeks) on the 0-100% seismic risk
scale.
6.2 Results and discussion
Mean estimates, displayed in Table 4, show that partici-
pants who received the forecasts for all three cities together
(joint mode), believed that people in Westerlea, who re-
ceived low level (but increasing) risk estimates, would be
less worried than people in Pryedge and Brookland, whose
risk levels were generally higher. One-way (repeated mea-
sures) ANOVA for mean worry estimates in the joint mode
condition yields a significant overall effect of location, F(2,
50) = 3.32, p = .044. Pairwise tests show that people in
Westerlea (low, increase) were expected to be less worried
than people in Pryedge (unchanging), t(51) = 2.44, p = .018,
as well as in Brookland (high, decrease), t(51) = 2.47, p
= .017 (the difference between Pryedge and Brookland is
not significant). No effect of level could be observed in the
separate mode conditions, where people in Westerlea were
believed to be, if anything, more concerned than the others
(no significant differences).
A majority of participants in all conditions believed that
the difference between T1 and T2 might be understood as
a trend that would continue into the future. The differ-
ences between the number of continuers compared to re-
versers were significant with binomial tests in all condi-
tions (p ≤ .012). In Condition A, only one single par-
ticipant believed that the next risk estimate in Westerlea
and Brookland would match the prediction issued at T2;
about 2/3 believed it would be still higher in Westerlea and
still lower in Brookland. In Condition B, 70% thought the
next prognosis in Westerlea would be even higher, and in
Condition D as many as 75% thought the next prognosis
would be lower, continuing the decreasing trend from T1 to
T2. As a result, the future prognoses for all cities became
very similar in terms of absolute risk level, with a mean
of around 40%, even in the joint presentation mode (the
modal increases/decreases were in all conditions 15 percent-
age points, indicating a linear projection of trends). Thus,
even if predicted worry was somewhat affected by risk level
(in the joint condition), predictions of future forecasts relied
mainly on trend information.
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7 General discussion
We examined in five studies non-experts’ interpretations of
revised prognoses about climate change and natural disas-
ters. A majority of participants in all conditions expected
that forecasts that had been revised once would be followed
by further revisions in the same direction. Across all condi-
tions, very few (2–22%) used the most rational strategy, to
discount the first forecast and retain the most recent one as
their best guess. These results provide strong support for a
trend effect in perception of revised forecasts. Rather than
taking the last forecast as the most likely future forecast, re-
ceivers use trend information to predict future prognoses.
This result is consistent with findings from other fields
showing that non-experts expect the continuation of past
trends in non-random sequences such as stock mar-
kets (De Bondt, 1993), temperature change, share prices
(Lewandowsky, 2011) and company sales, profit and loss
(Harvey & Reimers, 2013). However, the present findings
go beyond these studies. While previous studies have fo-
cused on people’s predictions of future target events based
on past events, we have studied people’s predictions of fu-
ture forecasts based on past forecasts.
When is it warranted to believe that an increase or de-
crease is set to continue, and when is it not? Like other
inductive inferences, extrapolations seem reasonable when
based on a large number of observations (time series). In
previous studies, participants have been given time series
with several data points, such as 20, 50, or 130 values, as a
basis for extrapolations (Harvey & Bolger, 1996; Harvey &
Reimers, 2013; Lewandowsky, 2011). In contrast, partici-
pants in the present studies derived trend information from
just two values.
Second, extrapolations seem reasonable in areas where
known mechanisms are responsible for further growth or de-
cline. This is the case for many natural phenomena (e.g.,
contagious diseases, increases or decreases in animal and
plant populations), climate changes, and even economic
trends. In contrast, extrapolating a “trend” in forecasts that
are revised once is arguably less rational. One must assume
that the forecasters have incorporated all available knowl-
edge about this subject into their most recent forecast. By
expecting a future forecast that is more extreme than ever
before (as far as participants know), participants implicitly
express that they know more about the future than does the
expert. This is a violation of the Golden rule of forecast-
ing (Armstrong, Green & Graefe, 2015), which states that
forecasters should be conservative by making proper use of
cumulative knowledge and not go beyond that knowledge.
If the expert expected the forecast to become even more ex-
treme in the future, she would presumably have taken this
into account in her most recent forecast. Thus, the original
forecast (at T1) should not really matter, as long as the cur-
rent forecast (at T2) is the one that is updated with the best
knowledge there is at present. So why do a majority of par-
ticipants expect it to undergo further, predictable changes?
In unfamiliar situations, humans sometimes misapply
strategies that are adaptive in other, more familiar situations
(Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009). It is
possible that people perceive the revised forecast in the same
way as they would perceive a real world change, failing to
distinguish between a change in X and a change in the pre-
diction of X. So when the climate researcher increases her
prediction of sea level rise by 2100 from 20 to 40 cm, people
respond as if it were the actual sea level that had changed.
If such a change had taken place, due to systematic causes
that remain operative over time (e.g., melting of polar ice),
it would make sense to predict the rise to continue.
Participants were told very little about the basis for the
forecasts and why they were revised. Background informa-
tion was deliberately vague, to be compatible with revisions
in either direction. Participants therefore had to mainly rely
on the forecast values to make their predictions. Because
human beings are pattern seekers, equipped with a percep-
tual and cognitive apparatus for detecting regularities even
in randomness (Elliman, 2006), identifying and continuing
a pattern or trend formed by the two numbers could be a
strategy employed in the absence of information about the
underlying mechanisms.
The task format might have led participants to emphasize
the trend more strongly than they would have done in a real
world setting. Wänke (2007) argues that many of the cog-
nitive biases in JDM research are partly due to the commu-
nicative setting. Research participants automatically assume
that all the information they are given is there on purpose,
and should be used. In our studies, respondents might be-
lieve the first forecast is relevant and should be taken into
account simply because it is mentioned. Disregarding the
first forecast would imply that the questionnaire provides
non-relevant information, and thus violates the cooperation
principle in communication (Grice, 1975). But this does not
in itself indicate how the first forecast should be taken into
account. One possibility would be to average both forecasts,
which very few did. Divergent forecasts could also be taken
as a sign of uncertainty, or even as evidence of a cyclical
pattern. Apparently most people consider a linear trend to
be the best pattern suggested by two forecasts issued at dif-
ferent points in time.3
3Although the means reported in Tables 1–3 seem to suggest reduced
projections, in line with the “trend damping” observed by Harvey and
Reimers (2013), the modal responses were in all conditions linear continu-
ations of the trend from T1 to T2. And of course some participants did not
extrapolate at all.
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7.1 Predictions of next forecast are moder-
ated by personal beliefs
Although participants projected both upward and downward
trends, they especially endorsed trends consistent with gen-
eral beliefs about the consequences of climate change. That
is, more participants followed upward trends for sea level
and temperature rise, and downward trends for grain pro-
ductivity. This was especially the case for respondents who
reported strong beliefs in anthropogenic climate changes.
This indicates that expectations of future forecasts are based
on trend information in combination with personal beliefs, a
finding consistent with the view that people make an initial
assessment based on their beliefs, and adjust a probability
qualifying the belief in a second phase (Lawrence, Good-
win, O’Connor, & Önkal, 2006). The result is also in line
with research showing that judgments of risk related to cli-
mate change are affected by values and beliefs held by the
individual (Austgulen & Stø, 2013; Heath & Gifford, 2006;
Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, 2007; McCright &
Dunlap, 2011; Slimak & Dietz, 2006), and that interpreta-
tion of uncertain climate statements varies according to atti-
tudes to climate change (Budescu, Por, & Broomell, 2012).
7.2 Implications for communication of uncer-
tainty
The present findings have potential implications for commu-
nication of risk and uncertainty. If forecasts from different
points of time are available, receivers may not interpret the
last one as final. Instead, they might interpret the most re-
cent forecast in light of previous prognoses and incorporate
a belief in further revisions into their evaluations. When cit-
izens are told that a flood risk is moderate, they may feel
reassured if they are told that the risk was high last week,
but threatened if told that the risk was low. As we have
seen, this is not just a matter of contrast (moderate risks in
comparison to high and low ones), but also the result of a
forecasted trend.
It is sometimes claimed that, when people are exposed to
scientific uncertainty, or to experts whomake divergent fore-
casts about future events, their trust in these forecasts and,
still worse, their belief in science, will suffer (see Friedman,
Dunwoody & Rogers, 2009, for discussions). People who
believe scientists disagree about climate change are less cer-
tain that climate change is occurring, and support climate
policy less (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf & Leis-
erowitz, 2011). The present studies suggest that discrepant
predictions formulated by the same expert (or group of ex-
perts) at different points in time, will not be conceived as
inconsistent, but rather as indicative of what they will say
and what will happen next. The present studies do not allow
strong conclusions about how this may affect people’s feel-
ings and beliefs. For instance, we found little effect of trend
on worry level (Study 5), and no clear effect on personal
surprise (Study 4). However, the results suggest that an ex-
pert can make her point more forcefully by being willing to
admit that earlier predictions were over- or understated; if
nothing else, it makes her present forecasts “evaluable” in
the sense that we learn in which direction she is moving.
8 Conclusion
People faced with a revised forecast expect it to continue
changing in the same direction in the future. Thus, two
forecasts made at two different points of time are enough
to suggest a trend. A forecast that has become more likely is
expected to become even more likely in the future, whereas
one that has become less likely is expected to become even
more doubtful in the future. Thus lay people’s prediction
of forecasts appear to violate the “golden rule” of forecast-
ing (Armstrong et al., 2015) by being anything but con-
servative, going beyond the most extreme current forecast.
Forecasters and risk communicators should be aware that
estimates about the future might be evaluated not only ac-
cording to their present level, but also in comparison to past
forecasts. Remember the forecasts of El Niño, mentioned
in the introduction? Two weeks after the downgraded fore-
cast, the Institute announced: “El Niño is (technically) here”
(Gawthrop, 2015, March 10). Surprised, anyone?
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